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Fast technological and structural change in the payment industry as well as central bank
backed initiatives in countries such as Uruguay, Sweden or China have rekindled inter-
est in fundamental questions about the monetary system.1 In modern economies this
system typically exhibits two tiers: While nonfinancial institutions in the private sector
use deposit liabilities of banks (and claims on deposits) as payment instruments, banks
themselves pay each other with reserves that are issued by the central bank. The prospect
of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) or “Reserves for All” brings that division
into question.2
Even where no CBDC has been introduced yet (that is, in most countries) the two-
tiered monetary system has recently undergone substantial change. In the wake of the
financial crises that erupted in 2007 balance sheets of central banks have lengthened and
money multipliers have collapsed, see figure 1: Reflecting quantitative easing, tightened
liquidity regulation, and other factors more and more deposits and other bank liabilities
that nonbanks use for payments are “backed” by claims that banks hold vis-a-vis the
central bank.3 Grassroots movements such as the Swiss “Vollgeld” initiative may have
failed to outlaw private money creation, but the world of payments today resembles a
“Vollgeld” system much more closely than fifteen years ago.4
In this paper, we subject the two-tiered monetary system, a purely CBDC-based
monetary arrangement, as well as an integrated system with deposits, reserves, and CBDC
to a positive and normative analysis. The questions we address include: What are the
characteristics of optimal monetary policy in a two-tiered system? Does the introduction
of CBDC alter equilibrium outcomes? If so, what monetary arrangement and money
multiplier is preferable on efficiency grounds? And, which payment system imposes a
higher burden on taxpayers, with possible repercussions for its political support? As a
byproduct of the answers to these questions we quantify the support that banks receive
from (implicit or explicit) lender of last resort guarantees by the central bank. We find
that implicit subsidies in the U.S. were on the order of up to 0.8 percent of GDP in some
years but negligible or even negative in others.
Our framework embeds a banking sector, deposits, reserves, and CBDC into the
baseline business cycle model; it can also be viewed as an extended Sidrauski (1967)
model. Households value goods, leisure, and the liquidity services provided by deposits
and CBDC. Neoclassical firms produce using labor and physical capital. Banks invest
in capital and reserves. Their main funding base are deposits and competition on the
market for deposits is limited (Drechsler et al., 2017). The central bank issues CBDC and
reserves which banks use to settle interbank payments. Managing the payment system
1“Libra” which is backed by the Libra Association (libra.org) probably constitutes the primary example
of technology driven change. For an overview of ongoing CBDC projects see for example Auer et al. (2020).
2Far into the twentieth century central banks commonly offered accounts also to nonbanks (BIS, 2018).
3Cash balances have also risen over the last decade. But the fall in money multipliers is predominantly
a consequence of increased reserves holdings by banks.
4“Positive Money” (positivemoney.org), the Swiss “Vollgeld” initiative (www.vollgeld-
initiative.ch/english), and other grassroots movements in several countries aim to curb inside money
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Figure 1: Money multipliers for M1 and M3 in the U.S., the Euro area, and Switzerland.
requires resources. Deposits, CBDC, and reserves may differ both with respect to their
liquidity services and resource requirements for payments. As shocks affect the payment
system the liquidity benefits for banks of holding reserves vary over time. The main policy
instruments of the consolidated government sector include the interest rates on reserves
and on CBCD as well as bank subsidies which help to address the lack of competition in
the banking sector.
Our positive analysis starts with a characterization result: The equilibrium conditions
in the economy with a two-tiered monetary system parallel those in the standard real
business cycle model, augmented by “pseudo wedges” in the Euler equation, the labor-
leisure first-order condition, and the resource constraint. Under standard functional form
assumptions the pseudo wedges reduce to simple summary statistics of structural shocks to
the payment system as well as two policy instruments—the liquidity premium on reserves
and the bank subsidy. Structural change in the payment system and policy changes
therefore affect business cycle dynamics in similar ways as distorting labor-income and
consumption taxes and government consumption. Along a balanced growth path there is
no intertemporal pseudo wedge relative to the baseline business cycle model but there are
pseudo wedges in the intratemporal first-order condition and the resource constraint.
The equilibrium liquidity premium on deposits reflects the degree of competition in the
banking sector; bank subsidies; the liquidity premium on reserves; as well as the structural
shocks to the payment system which affect the benefits for banks of holding reserves. We
allow for two types of such benefits, internal and external. Banks internalize the former
but not the latter, for example because they take into account that liquidity shortages
might trigger costly asset liquidation while disregarding the fact that fire sales also affect
other financial institutions. The parameter determining the internal benefits affects banks’
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operating costs both directly and indirectly, through its effect on banks’ choice of reserve
holdings. Accordingly, higher internal benefits of reserve holdings may raise or lower
the equilibrium deposit rate. In contrast, higher external benefits unambiguously lower
deposit rates.
Our positive results also let us compare the effectiveness of policy responses at a
“reversal interest rate.” When the equilibrium deposit rate hits a threshold level policy
makers can intervene in two ways to push the rate back up above that threshold level:
by raising the interest rate on reserves, or by subsidizing deposits. We find that raising
the interest rate on reserves is fiscally cheaper than raising subsidies when the external
component of the benefits of reserve holdings is important or the risk-free interest rate on
illiquid assets small.
Next, we analyze optimality. We start by characterizing the outcome chosen by a social
planner that is only constrained by production and payment technology. Not surprisingly,
a modified Friedman (1969) rule emerges: Households are satiated with liquidity up to
the point where liquidity benefits equal the social (resource) costs of managing liquidity.
In the case of CBDC these costs are the CBDC operating costs, which are borne by the
central bank. In the case of deposits they are the deposit operating costs, which are
borne by commercial banks, as well as the costs for reserve operations which are borne
by the central bank. The planner relies on the cost minimizing combination of deposits
and CBDC, taking the liquidity benefits of deposits relative to CBDC into account.
In contrast to the social planner, the Ramsey government controls the allocation and
liquidity only indirectly, by way of setting the policy instruments. We show that never-
theless, the Ramsey government can implement the social planner allocation. In a CBDC
based monetary regime this is simple. The central bank simply needs to set the interest
rate on CBDC at a level that reflects the social costs and to price banks out of the market
by setting the interest rate on reserves sufficiently low.
In a two-tiered monetary system the situation is more challenging as the government
needs to correct two distortions in order to align bank incentives with societal tradeoffs.
The first distortion relates to lack of competition in the banking sector which reduces the
quantity of deposits (and deposit interest rates) below the socially optimal level. The
second distortion relates to the fact that banks do not internalize the external benefits of
their reserve holdings. The public sector can simultaneously correct both distortions by
employing bank deposit subsidies and setting the interest rate on reserves appropriately.
Even in a two-tiered monetary system the Ramsey policy therefore implements the first
best.
The optimal subsidy on bank deposits may be positive or negative, depending on
the importance of external benefits of reserves holdings. Intuitively, with large external
benefits the Ramsey policy subsidizes reserves by paying high interest on reserves. This
distorts the incentive for banks towards seeking more deposit financing. If the distortion is
sufficiently strong to outweigh the opposite distortion due to lack of competition then the
optimal deposit subsidy is negative. When external benefits of reserve holdings are absent,
in contrast, then the optimal interest rate on reserves reflects the social costs of reserve
operations and there is no distortion that leads banks to seek excessive deposit funding.
However, the distortion due to lack of competition remains present and to counter that
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latter distortion, the Ramsey government subsidizes deposits.
Under standard functional form assumptions we derive transparent optimal policy
rules for the spread on reserves and bank subsidies. The interest-rate-on-reserves-spread
rule that we find is strikingly simple: The spread should equal the central bank’s marginal
cost of operating reserves, times the share of the benefits of reserves holdings that banks
internalize. Parallel to Taylor (1993)-type interest rate rules that are motivated by the
goal to stabilize inflation and output gaps, the spread rule in our model signals the
appropriate monetary policy stance as far as the efficient liquidity provision is concerned.
The accompanying policy rule for subsidies assures that banks’ optimizing choices support
the optimal liquidity provision.
Our next set of results concerns equivalence. The leading question we address is
whether substitution of CBDC for deposits alters the equilibrium allocation and price
system. The substitution may be partial, for instance because CBDC is introduced and
some households adopt it and convert their means of payment from deposits into CBDC.
Or, hypothetically, it may be complete as in a “Vollgeld” regime without private money
creation.5
Building on earlier equivalence results in Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) and Niepelt
(2020) we find that a substitution of CBDC for deposits does not alter the equilibrium
allocation and price system as long as the relative liquidity services of deposits and CBDC
coincide with the relative resource costs that the two means of payment generate at the
margin. The relative liquidity services are determined by the usefulness of deposits and
CBDC for transaction purposes; the relative resource costs reflect the operating costs
of deposit and CBDC based payments as well as the central bank’s costs of managing
reserves transactions.
In the equivalent equilibrium with CBDC the length of the household’s balance sheet
does not change since the household swaps assets (deposits, CBDC, and capital). In
contrast, the balance sheet of a bank shortens because the bank holds less reserves while
investing the same amount as before the intervention in physical capital. The bank
funding that compensates for the reduction in deposits net of reduced reserves holdings
comes from the central bank: it provides a loan to the bank which in turn is financed by
the net funding the central bank gains (new CBDC holdings of households net of reduced
reserves holdings by banks).6
In order to assure that the noncompetitive banks go along with these equivalent bal-
ance sheet positions the central bank loan to banks must have the same effective interest
rate as the deposit funding in the equilibrium without CBDC. Since the net costs of
deposit funding reflect the interest rate on deposits, the interest rate on reserves, the op-
erating costs of deposit based payments, and bank subsidies, the equivalent central bank
loan interest rate depends on all these factors as well. That is, variation in spreads on
deposits or reserves, structural shocks to the payment system, and policy changes all af-
fect the equivalent central bank loan interest rate. The formula for the equivalent central
5A complete substitution is largely hypothetical because outside the model, “money” is difficult to
define and its creation by banks or other actors even harder to suppress.
6If the deposits in the initial equilibrium are not collateralized then equivalence requires that the
central bank loan is not collateralized either.
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bank loan interest rate that we derive applies independently of specific functional form
assumptions, both in- and outside the model of the paper.
We use this formula to assess the funding cost reduction for banks due to their ability
to issue liquid liabilities. This funding cost reduction, which according to the logic of the
model can be interpreted as a subsidy to banks, is the product of two terms: The quantity
of net funding that banks generate by issuing deposits, namely the deposit base net of
reserve holdings; and the liquidity premium on that funding net of deposit (and reserves)
operating costs. Using U.S. data for the period 1999 to 2017 we find that the funding
cost reduction for U.S. banks amounted to roughly 0.4 to 0.8 percent of GDP just before
and around the financial crisis. In contrast, banks did not benefit from cost reductions,
or they even bore additional funding costs, once financial markets had calmed. These
numbers compare with NIPA data for financial sector profits on the order of 3 percent
of GDP prior to the financial crisis, negative profits during the crisis, and 2 to 3 percent
after the financial crisis.
The equivalent central bank loan rate displays a downward trend, falling by roughly 3
percent over the sample period, with some fluctuations. Prior to 2009 when the reserves-
to-deposits ratio was very small the equivalent central bank loan rate moved roughly in
parallel with the deposit interest rate. Once the reserves-to-deposits ratio increased the
equivalent loan interest rate rose as long as reserves paid lower interest than deposits since
one dollar of net funding required more than one dollar of deposit funding. After 2015
the deposit rate fell short of the interest rate on reserves and this contributed negatively
to the equivalent loan rate.
Finally, we briefly consider political economy implications. We show that unlike a
CBDC based system a two-tiered monetary system with deposits and reserves requires
fiscal support by the taxpayer, even in the absence of crises, if monetary policy is con-
ducted optimally. We argue that this could work towards strengthening the public support
for the introduction of retail CBDC and that it might have implications for central bank
independence.
Related Literature The paper relates to an old literature that discusses two-tiered
monetary systems and analyzes their properties. While money-multiplier analysis dates
back at least to the 1940s, Gurley and Shaw (1960) introduce the distinction between in-
side money issued by banks and outside money supplied by the government. Tobin (1963;
1969; 1985) discusses the fractional reserve banking system and proposes a precursor to
CBDC. More recently, Benes and Kumhof (2012) set up a New Keynesian DSGE model
and argue that banks’ money creation ex nihilo destabilizes the economy. Andolfatto
(2018) studies the macroeconomic consequences of banks’ money creation in an OLG
framework. Faure and Gersbach (2018) contrast the welfare under a fractional reserve
banking architecture and an architecture with 100% reserve banking. In Taudien (2020)
inside money issued by competitive banks reduces the financing costs of producers.7
Following literatures in macroeconomics and banking we assume that reserves affect
7For an analysis of complementarities between different elements in contemporary monetary systems
(bank lending, insured deposits, lender of last resort, prudential supervision) see Farhi and Tirole (2020).
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the operating costs of banks in a deposit based payment system, without modeling the
market micro structure (e.g., Bolton et al., 2020). In Kiyotaki and Moore (2019) a liquid
security, like reserves, relaxes resalability constraints and increases productivity (reduces
costs). Bianchi and Bigio (2020) analyze the portfolio choice of banks and monetary
policy transmission in a frictional interbank market with bargaining; the shocks in their
framework, which are related to matching frictions and the volatility of deposit with-
drawals, can be mapped into the structural shocks we posit in the model. Parlour et al.
(2020) analyze the “liquidity externality” that arises because banks need to hold reserves
against claims issued by their competitors. In our model reserve holdings exert a positive
externality on competitors, in addition to lowering a bank’s expected operating costs.
A recent literature analyzes potential implications of the introduction of a retail
CBDC.8 Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) simulate a rich DSGE model under the assump-
tion that the introduction of CBDC lowers real interest rates and transaction costs, with
macroeconomic consequences. In Keister and Sanches (2020) CBDC issuance helps to
promote exchange but it may also crowd out deposits which are crucial for investment
when the central bank cannot refinance banks. Keister and Sanches (2020) study the re-
sulting tradeoff under different assumptions about the substitutability of cash, deposits,
and CBDC. Böser and Gersbach (2020) argue that the introduction of CBDC in conjunc-
tion with tight central bank collateral requirements and account switching costs could
render commercial bank lending nonviable. In Piazzesi and Schneider (2020) asset hold-
ings on the balance sheet of financial institutions generate social costs and credit lines by
commercial banks provide liquidity without requiring such asset holdings; this gives rise
to real effects when households hold CBDC for precautionary reasons.
In Andolfatto (2019) banks have access to central bank facilities. The introduction
of CBDC leads banks to adjust their pricing; it does not undermine bank lending but
reduces bank rents and improves financial inclusion. Chiu et al. (2019) contains a quan-
titative analysis that combines elements of Keister and Sanches (2020) and Andolfatto
(2019). Keister and Monnet (2020) analyze how the introduction of CBDC could shape
information asymmetries between banks and the central bank and by implication, finan-
cial stability. In Williamson (2019) CBDC is a more efficient means of payment than cash
but CBDC issuance forces the central bank to hold more assets and to compete with com-
mercial banks which require assets as collateral. Our framework connects more closely
to the baseline macroeconomic workhorse model and it analyzes policy in a two-tiered
system in addition to studying equivalence; we abstract from cash but this is without loss
of generality.9
Our equivalence result generalizes findings in Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019). Rel-
ative to that work we introduce resource costs of operating a payment system as well as
a reserves layer; we derive the equivalent central bank loan interest rate; and we use the
8See Niepelt (2018) for a review of early contributions to this literature.
9See also Niepelt (2020) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2020). Kahn et al. (2018), Kumhof and
Noone (2018), Bindseil (2020), and Auer and Böhme (2020), among others, discuss design options for
retail CBDCs. Cash could affect the bargaining power of market participants, as in Lagos and Zhang
(2020). While this would alter the exact equilibrium conditions it would not change the basic conclusions
as far as deposits versus CBDC are concerned.
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latter to assess implicit bank subsidies in the U.S. Moreover, we study optimal policy
when equivalence does not hold. Wallace (1981) derives an equivalence result in an OLG
economy; he shows that it is irrelevant whether households hold physical capital directly
or indirectly, via their money holdings at a central bank invested in capital. Bryant
(1983) summarizes equivalence results. Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) establish that
open-market operations are neutral when money does not serve as a medium of exchange.
Sargent (1987, 5.4) presents results on equivalent fiscal-monetary policies in the opposite
case.
Our analysis of optimal monetary policy complements large literatures building on
the “New Keynesian” and “New Monetarist” frameworks; for overviews, see for example
Woodford (2003), Gaĺı (2015), and Rocheteau and Nosal (2017). Unlike the “New Keyne-
sian” framework the present paper emphasizes the role of money as a means of payment
and store of value rather than unit of account; it abstracts from nominal rigidities. Unlike
the “New Monetarist” framework but in line with a large literature following Sidrauski
(1967) (e.g., Di Tella, 2020) the paper emphasizes connections with the baseline business
cycle models used for policy analysis, rather than the market micro structure underlying
the supply and demand for liquidity. Relative to typical contributions in either the “New
Keynesian” or “New Monetarist” literature we analyze the role of a two-tiered monetary
system, equivalence relations, implicit bank subsidies, and the consequences of introducing
CBDC.
Structure of the Paper The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
lays out the monetary economy and section 3 characterizes general equilibrium. In sec-
tion 4 we analyze the social planner outcome and the Ramsey policy. Section 5 assesses
the equivalence of monetary arrangements with deposits and reserves versus CBDC, and
we quantify the implicit bank subsidies in a deposit based monetary system. Section 6
briefly considers political economy aspects and section 7 concludes.
2 A Monetary Economy
We consider an infinite horizon production economy with a continuum of mass one of
homogeneous infinitely-lived households. The households own a succession of two-period-
lived, monopsonistic banks and of one-period-lived, competitive firms. Monetary and
fiscal policy is determined by a consolidated government/central bank.
The model extends the framework in Sidrauski (1967) threefold. First, it features two
means of payment at the retail level, issued by banks and the central bank respectively; one
can think of the two as deposits on the one hand and central bank digital currency (CBDC)
or “reserves for all” on the other. Second, it allows for resource costs of circulating these
means of payment and running the payment system. Finally, the model features a reserve
layer: In addition to possibly serving as a payment provider for households (by issuing
CBDC) the central bank settles payments between banks; the means of payment for
such settlements is another central bank liability—reserves. This setting conforms to the
typical arrangement in modern economies where the settlement of customer transactions
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between banks occurs through a central-bank-run payment system.
2.1 Households












t + wt(1− xt) + πt − ct − τt, (1)
kt+1,mt+1, nt+1 ≥ 0.
Here, ct and xt denote household consumption of the good and leisure at date t, respec-
tively, and zt+1 denotes “effective real balances” carried from t into t + 1. Effective real
balances are a weighted sum of (real) base money held by nonbanks, mt+1, and bank
deposits, nt+1,
zt+1 ≡ λtmt+1 + nt+1.
We typically refer to mt+1 as “money” (CBDC) and to nt+1 as “deposits.” The parame-
ter λt > 0 indexes the liquidity benefits of money relative to those of deposits. While we
assume that the parameter is exogenous many of our results do not require that assump-
tion: Even if λt were endogenous, for instance as a function of mt+1 and nt+1, many key
results and their intuitions would go through (at least locally) but the representation of
the results would be less transparent. Also, we abstract from cash and conjecture that
this simplification is not important either.10
The felicity function u is increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions;
the discount factor β is positive and strictly smaller than unity. As is well known, this
“money in the utility function” specification can represent several monetary frictions,
including a “shopping time” friction which renders real balances helpful to economize on
time spent shopping consumption goods.11 All key results of the paper are robust to
changes in the assumptions that give rise to a demand for liquidity. What matters is not
why households demand liquidity services, but only that they do so.
Equation (1) represents the household’s budget constraint. It states that the household
invests in capital, kt+1, as well as real balances. The household finances these investments
as well as consumption outlays and taxes, τt, out of wage income, which equals the product
of the wage, wt, and labor supply, 1−xt; distributed profits, πt; and the gross return on its
portfolio. The latter consists of the returns on capital, ktR
k
t , money, mtR
m
t , and deposits,
ntR
n





both nominal interest rates and inflation; the decomposition between the two components
is irrelevant for now.
10Our key results concern the societal tradeoffs between deposits and money. We conjecture that these
tradeoffs would not fundamentally be altered in the presence of cash.
11See Saving (1971), McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), Feenstra (1986), and Croushore (1993). We
do not aim to provide micro-foundations for the retail demand for means of payment but to model the
composition of monetary balances given such demand, whatever its sources are.
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For simplicity, we do not index variables and parameters by history. Variables ct, xt,






t+1, wt, πt, τt and parameter λt are measurable with
respect to information available at date t. That is, real interest rates on deposits and
money are risk-free (inflation risk is negligible) while the rate of return on capital may be
risky.
In equilibrium capital holdings and real balances are strictly positive. The household’s
optimality conditions are given by the following Euler equations for kt+1, mt+1, nt+1, and
xt:
uc(ct, zt+1, xt) = βEt[Rkt+1uc(ct+1, zt+2, xt+1)], (2)
uc(ct, zt+1, xt) ≥ βRmt+1Et[uc(ct+1, zt+2, xt+1)] + λtuz(ct, zt+1, xt), mt+1 ≥ 0,
uc(ct, zt+1, xt) ≥ βRnt+1Et[uc(ct+1, zt+2, xt+1)] + uz(ct, zt+1, xt), nt+1 ≥ 0,
ux(ct, zt+1, xt) = uc(ct, zt+1, xt)wt. (3)
The weak inequalities in the Euler equation for mt+1 or nt+1, respectively, hold with
equality if mt+1 or nt+1 is strictly positive. To express the latter two Euler equations




where sdft+1 ≡ βuc(ct+1, zt+2)/uc(ct, zt+1) denotes the stochastic discount factor. When
the household holds payment instruments of type i ∈ {m,n} then the associated first-
order condition reads







When the household holds both payment instruments then, additionally,
Rft+1 −Rmt+1 = λt(R
f
t+1 −Rnt+1). (5)
According to equation (4) payment instrument i enjoys a liquidity premium when λituz(ct, zt+1, xt) >





Equivalently, −χit+1 equals the spread on payment instrument i compared with a risk-free
bond which does not provide liquidity services.
When the household holds both payment instruments then, according to equation (5),
the liquidity premium on money exceeds (falls short of) the liquidity premium on deposits
if money is more (less) liquid than deposits (λt > (<)1).
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2.2 Banks
A bank at date t issues deposits, borrows from the central bank, lt+1, and collects gov-
ernment subsidies on deposits at rate θt; it invests in capital and reserves, rt+1.
12 The
bank takes the rates of return on capital and reserves, the stochastic discount factor, and
the subsidy rate as given. In contrast, it chooses the quantity of deposits and central
bank loans subject to the funding supply schedules of households and the central bank.
Specifically, the bank acts as a monopsonist on the market for deposits.
To introduce a role for reserves we assume that larger reserves holdings relative to
deposits lower the operating costs in the retail payment system, νt. (We do not need to
stipulate a minimum reserves requirement.) One narrative that can motivate this assump-
tion envisions a banking sector that is segmented by region, with one monopsonistic bank
in each region.13 The banks settle payments among each other (on behalf of their clients)
by transferring reserves. If a bank lacks reserves to cover net payments to other finan-
cial institutions then it needs to transfer ownership of capital but this generates resource
costs related to, e.g., fire sales, deadweight losses, or legal charges. As a consequence,
the resource costs of running the payment system are decreasing in rt+1 and increasing in
nt+1.
14
We also allow νt to vary with the stock of reserves and deposits of other banks. This
allows us to capture positive externalities of reserves holdings. They are present, for
example, when fire sales by one bank increase the costs of other institutions that lack
(reserves) liquidity. Formally, letting ζt+1 ≡ rt+1/nt+1 denote the reserves-to-deposits
ratio of a bank and ζ̄t+1 ≡ r̄t+1/n̄t+1 the aggregate reserves-to-deposits ratio, we make
the following assumptions about operating costs: When a bank has no deposits then its
operating costs equals zero; nt+1 = 0 ⇒ nt+1νt = 0. When all other institutions have no
deposits (n̄t+1 = 0) then the bank’s operating costs per unit of own deposits are large but
bounded, ruling out asymmetric equilibria with n̄t+1 = 0 but nt+1 > 0. And in all other
cases (nt+1 > 0 and n̄t+1 > 0) νt is given by the function νt(ζt+1, ζ̄t+1), which is strictly
decreasing in both arguments, strictly convex, and satisfies ν12,t = 0 or ν11,t ≥ ν22,t, as
well as limζt+1↓0 ν1,t =∞.15 These assumptions imply that in equilibrium, ζt+1 = ζ̄t+1 and
reserves are strictly positive if and only if deposits are strictly positive.
12Rather than directly investing in physical capital the bank might invest in securities (e.g., loans to
companies or investment vehicles) which eventually fund physical capital accumulation. Without loss of
generality we abstract from bank equity. Bank equity would finance additional capital investments by
banks and it would be held by households who in turn would invest less in physical capital.
13Alternatively, we could assume that the banking sector is monopolistically (monopsonistically) com-
petitive and effective real balances are a composite of deposit holdings at different banks. The optimality
conditions of a bank in Cournot equilibrium closely parallel the conditions of a monopsony bank derived
below (see, e.g., Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
14See the discussion in the literature review on models of the demand for reserves and interbank
payments.
15We denote the partial derivatives of νt with respect to its first and second argument, respectively, by
ν1,t and ν2,t and we use similar notation for higher order derivatives.
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The program of a bank at date t reads16
max
nt+1,lt+1,rt+1
πb1,t + Et[sdft+1 πb2,t+1]
s.t. πb1,t = −nt+1(νt(ζt+1, ζ̄t+1)− θt), (6)




nt+1, lt+1 ≥ 0,
where πb1,t and π
b
2,t+1 denote the cash flows generated in the first and second period of
the bank’s operations, respectively. The first constraint relates the cash flow in the first
period of operation to the operating costs net of subsidies. The second constraint relates
the cash flow in the second period to the gross yield on physical capital and reserves
holdings net of gross interest payments on deposits and loans.
The marginal effects of nt+1 and lt+1 on the bank’s objective read (dropping arguments
of the νt function)
−(νt(. . .)− θt) + ν1,t(. . .)ζt+1 + Et[sdft+1(Rkt+1 −Rnt+1 − nt+1Rnt+1
′(nt+1))],
Et[sdft+1(Rkt+1 −Rlt+1 − lt+1Rlt+1
′
(lt+1))].
Using the household’s Euler equation we can therefore express the first-order conditions
with respect to nt+1 and lt+1 as
−(νt(. . .)− θt) + ν1,t(. . .)ζt+1 + χnt+1 ≤ nt+1Rnt+1
′(nt+1)/R
f





t+1, lt+1 ≥ 0. (9)
The left-hand side of inequality (8) represents the marginal expected profit from deposit
issuance, holding the interest rate on deposits constant: Managing the marginal unit
of deposits costs νt(. . .) − θt and in addition, the marginal unit increases the operating
costs for inframarginal units, but it also yields a gain if the deposit liquidity premium is
positive, χnt+1 > 0. The right-hand side equals the profit loss on inframarginal deposits
due to the increase in Rnt+1 that is triggered by higher deposit issuance.
17 Deposit issuance
is profitable at the margin as long as the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side.
Inequality (9) relates the marginal expected profit from central bank loans holding the
loan interest rate constant, χlt+1 ≡ 1 − Rlt+1/R
f
t+1, to the cost increase on inframarginal
loans due to more expensive funding. When deposits or central bank loans are strictly








2,t, θt, and νt are measurable with respect to infor-
mation available at date t. We do not normalize the typical bank’s portfolio positions by the number of
banks. That is, we state the conditions as they apply for the banking sector as a whole.
17For this increase to be well defined the bank must perceive mt+1 to be less than infinitely elastic
with respect to nt+1. This condition is satisfied, for example, when the central bank targets mt+1 or
mt+1 relative to nt+1; it is violated when the central bank targets R
m
t+1 at a level that renders money
competitive with deposits.
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positive then the inequalities (8) or (9) simplify to












where ηn,t+1 and ηl,t+1, respectively, denote the elasticity of deposit and loan supply by
households and the central bank with respect to Rnt+1 and R
l
t+1 (cf. Klein, 1971; Monti,
1972).
Finally, turning to reserves, when nt+1 > 0 such that reserves are interior then the
corresponding first-order condition reads




Intuitively, the optimal choice of reserves equalizes the gain due to lower operating costs
and the loss due to the bank’s lower return when the spread on reserves, χrt+1 ≡ 1 −
Rrt+1/R
f
t+1, is positive. Since in equilibrium ζt+1 = ζ̄t+1 equation (10) implies a unique
mapping from the opportunity costs of holding reserves to the equilibrium reserves-to-
deposits ratio, which we write as ζt+1 = ν
−1
1,t (−χrt+1).18














ν−11,t (−χ), ν−11,t (−χ)
)
+ χν−11,t (−χ).
Function ν̃t summarizes the direct and indirect effect of deposits on the bank’s operating
costs: A marginal increase in deposit issuance raises the total operating costs not only
directly, by νt(ζt+1, ζt+1), but also indirectly because νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) increases. The magni-
tude of these effects is pinned down by the opportunity costs of reserves and the bank’s
first-order condition for reserves, equation (10).
It sometimes is instructive to consider a reduced form version of the model without the
reserves layer. In that version νt is exogenous and banks therefore do not hold reserves.
Accordingly, ν̃t(−χrt+1) is replaced by the exogenous νt in that case.
18By the mean value theorem, for any ε > 0 there exists an ι between 0 and ε such that ν1,t(ζ+ε, ζ+ε) =
ν1,t(ζ, ζ) + (ν11,t(ζ + ι, ζ + ι) + ν12,t(ζ + ι, ζ + ι))ε. We claim that ν11,t + ν12,t > 0 such that the function
ν1,t(ζ, ζ) is monotonically increasing in ζ and therefore invertible. Strict convexity of νt implies that its
Hessian is positive definite such that, in particular, ν11,t > 0 and ν11,t + 2ν12,t + ν22,t > 0. Recall that we
assume ν12,t = 0 or ν11,t ≥ ν22,t. In the former case the claim is directly established. In the latter case
as well because ν11,t + ν12,t > ν11,t − (ν11,t + ν22,t)/2 > (ν11,t − ν22,t)/2 ≥ 0.
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2.3 Firms
Firms rent capital, κt, and labor, `t, and produce the output good to maximize profits.
They take wages, the rental rate of capital, Rkt − 1 + δ, and the goods price as given; the
rental rate reflects the depreciation rate, δ.19 Letting ft denote a neoclassical production




s.t. πft = ft(κt, `t)− κt(Rkt − 1 + δ)− wt`t. (11)
The first-order conditions read
Rkt − 1 + δ = fκ,t(κt, `t), (12)
wt = f`,t(κt, `t). (13)
Since ft exhibits constant returns to scale and firms are competitive, equilibrium profits
will equal zero.
2.4 Government
The consolidated government collects taxes, pays subsidies, invests in capital, kgt+1, lends
to the bank, and issues money and reserves.20 The unit resource costs of managing
money equal µt, and the unit resource costs of managing reserves equals ρt. Accordingly,
the government budget constraint reads






t−mtRmt −rtRrt +τt−nt+1θt−mt+1µt−rt+1ρt. (14)
2.5 Market Clearing
Households inelastically supply labor. Labor and capital market clearing as well as the
bank’s balance sheet identity and the definition of total profits require




Walras’ law implies that market clearing on the markets for labor and capital as well
as the budget constraints of households, banks, firms, and the government imply market
clearing on the market for the output good. Specifically, combining equations (1), (6),
(7), (11), (14), and (15) yields the resource constraint
κt+1 = ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ct −mt+1µt − nt+1νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− rt+1ρt. (16)
19Variables πft , κt+1 and `t are measurable with respect to information available at date t.
20Variable kgt+1 is measurable with respect to information available at date t.
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2.7 Policy and Equilibrium
A policy P consists of {τt, θt}t≥0; {mt+1}t≥0, {Rmt+1}t≥0, or {χmt+1}t≥0 if the central bank
issues money and targets its quantity, interest rate, or spread, respectively; a loan supply
schedule if the central bank extends loans; as well as {rt+1}t≥0, {Rrt+1}t≥0, or {χrt+1}t≥0
if the central bank issues reserves and targets their quantity, interest rate, or spread
respectively.
We can now define equilibrium:
Definition 1. An equilibrium with means of payment of type i ∈ {m,n} and conditional
on policy P consists of
• a positive allocation, {ct, xt, kt+1, kgt+1, κt+1, `t}t≥0;
• positive money, deposit, and reserve holdings and loans, {mt+1, nt+1, rt+1, lt+1}t≥0;
• and a positive price (and shadow price) system, {wt, Rkt , Rmt , Rnt , Rrt+1}t≥0,
such that (1)–(8), (10)–(15) (and by implication (16)) are satisfied, and the asset positions
as well as the price system are consistent with the policy. If the central bank extends
loans then (9) also must be satisfied with equality and the price system also includes the
interest rate on loans, {Rlt+1}t≥0.
2.8 Functional Form Assumptions
In parts of the analysis we will impose the following functional form assumptions:
Assumption 1. Preferences and the deposit operating costs, respectively, satisfy
u(ct, zt+1, xt) =
(











where ϑ, ψ ∈ (0, 1); σ > 0, 6= 1; φ1,t, φ2,t ≥ 0; ϕ ≥ 1. Function v either is strictly increasing
and concave or constant.
Note that the preference specification allows for a balanced growth path along which
consumption, wages, and asset holdings grow at the same rate while interest rates, spreads,
labor supply and leisure remain constant (King et al., 1988). The elasticity of substitution
between ct and zt+1 is given by ψ
−1. For v′(xt) = 0 the model reduces to a specification
without leisure. For ϕ = 1, the model variant without a reserves layer results.
3 General Equilibrium
In this section we discuss positive implications of the model.
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3.1 Model Solution
We start with an example and show how the model can easily be solved. We focus on the
empirically most relevant case of a monetary arrangement with deposits and no money
(CBDC) and impose assumption 1. In appendix A we present detailed derivations and
discuss other constellations, including the case with money and different central bank
targets.
The key steps in the derivation are as follows: First, we show that the household
holds deposits in proportion to consumption and depending on χnt+1. Second, we solve
the bank’s problem given the demand for real balances by the household, the spread on
reserves, the subsidy, as well as the shocks impinging on the interbank payment system
(reflected in the function νt). This yields closed form solutions that relate χ
n
t+1 and ζt+1
to χrt+1, θt, φ1,t, φ2,t as well as other parameters. Finally, we combine these results to find
the three comprehensive equilibrium conditions
c−σt v(xt) = βEt
[





















κt+1 = ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ctΩrct (χrt+1, θt).
This system of equilibrium conditions (plus a transversality condition) corresponds to
the conditions in the basic real business cycle (RBC) model (King et al., 1988) with house-
hold preferences given by u(ct, xt) = (c
1−σ
t −1)/(1−σ)v(xt), augmented by three “pseudo













t+1, θt); and a term
multiplying consumption in the resource constraint, Ωrct (χ
r
t+1, θt). These three terms are
determined by the functions Ωit(χ
r
t+1, θt), i ∈ {c, x, rc} which in turn depend on policy,
(χrt+1, θt), and the payment technology shocks. Conditional on the shocks and policy
instruments the model thus can be solved exactly like the RBC model.
The Ωit(χ
r
t+1, θt) terms can directly be compared with wedges in an RBC model due to
labor-income taxes at rate τxt , consumption taxes at rate τ
c
t , as well as government con-
sumption, gt. More specifically, the RBC model with taxes and government consumption
immediately results once we replace Ωct(χ
r





t+1, θt) by (1− τxt )−1;
and Ωrct (χ
r
t+1, θt) by (gt + ct)/ct. Unlike tax wedges the pseudo wedges in our monetary
framework should not be interpreted as efficiency wedges, however. They simply repre-
sent the additional terms relative to a frictionless RBC model that deposits, reserves, and
banks introduce into the equilibrium conditions.
For ϑ → 0, Ωit(χrt+1, θt) → 1 (see the appendix) and the model collapses to the RBC
model. Along a balanced growth path with constant policy the intertemporal pseudo
wedge also equals one21 but the intratemporal pseudo wedge and the term in the resource
constraint differ from unity. Specifically, the pseudo wedge in the first-order condition
21The same result follows if utility is separable between consumption and real balances, ψ = σ.
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t+1, θt) represents the equilibrium deposit spread as a function of policy and
shocks (see the appendix). Compared with the RBC model, the presence of payments
(ϑ > 0) thus has similar effects on the consumption-leisure tradeoff as the tax wedge due
to a distorting labor-income tax that varies with policy.
Since our framework with deposits, bank market power, and reserves directly maps into
the dominant macro workhorse model, it lends itself to a straightforward analysis by policy
institutions using established methods. This remains the case when additional elements
are introduced. For example, it is trivial to include tax distortions. As the derivations
in the appendix make clear a distorting tax on labor income would simply introduce an
additional (exogenous) tax wedge in the consumption-leisure first-order condition. The
same holds true in the other model variants discussed in the appendix.
3.2 Real Allocation and Monetary Policy Nonneutrality
In a steady state the marginal utility of consumption is constant and monetary pol-
icy therefore does not affect the capital-labor ratio, which is pinned down by the Euler
equation for capital.22 This result holds independently of assumption 1 as long as the
consumption-to-real-balances ratio is stationary.23 Along a balanced growth path mone-
tary policy does not affect the capital-labor ratio either when it enters the expression for
the marginal utility of consumption in equilibrium separably, as it does under assump-
tion 1 (see the equilibrium conditions given earlier).
In contrast, the payment system and monetary policy do affect the consumption-
leisure ratio along a balanced growth path (and during the transition). We have already
established this for the case where assumption 1 holds. The nonneutrality arises because
real balances affect the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure to a different extent.24
From the resource constraint the payment system and monetary policy then also affect
output and its composition.
Being a “real” model the framework exhibits monetary neutrality: If equilibrium is
consistent with a given amount of nominal balances and a given price level then it is also
consistent with nominal balances and prices that are scaled by a common positive factor;
such scaling leaves real interest rates and liquidity premia unaffected. Whether the model
also exhibits superneutrality depends on one’s assumption about how inflation is passed
through to interest rates. Under the standard assumption that real risk-free rates are not
affected by anticipated inflation while real rates on money or deposits fall (because they
are fixed or inelastic), the liquidity premia χm and χn rise together with inflation implying
22If real balances constituted an argument of the production function (with real balances and capital
as substitutes) the model would feature a “Tobin effect” (Tobin, 1965; Fischer, 1972).
23See Walsh (2017, 2.2.1) for a discussion of steady states with nonstationary consumption-to-real-
balances ratios.
24That is, because Ωct(χ
r
t+1, θt) 6= Ωxt (χrt+1, θt).
17
reduced demand for means of payment. As discussed above, inflation differentially affects
the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure in this case, and thus the allocation.25
3.3 Liquidity Premia












, ϕ ≥ 1, ψ ∈ (0, 1)
(see appendix A). Accordingly, a higher (lower) liquidity premium on reserves drives up
(down) the liquidity premium on deposits. In contrast, a higher bank subsidy reduces the
liquidity premium and raises the equilibrium interest rate on deposits.
Higher external costs due to limited reserve holdings (higher φ2,t) unambiguously raise
the liquidity premium on deposits. Intuitively, a higher φ2,t raises the costs for banks but
banks shift these costs partly to households. More surprisingly, higher internal costs due
to limited reserve holdings (higher φ1,t) have an ambiguous effect on χ
n
t+1: The effect is
positive (negative) when φ2,t or ϕ are small (large) relative to φ1,t. Intuitively, a higher φ1,t
induces banks to hold more reserves relative to deposits, driving up the costs of reserve
holdings but reducing the internal and external direct costs of managing the payment
system which are reflected in the function νt.
We state this last finding as a proposition:
Proposition 1. With external benefits of reserve holdings, higher internal benefits can
reduce the liquidity premium on deposits (raise the deposit interest rate). Under assump-
tion 1 this is the case when φ1,t + φ2,t(ϕ
−1 − 1) < 0.
Proof. Differentiation of χ̃nt+1(χ
r





∝ φ1,t + φ2,t(ϕ−1 − 1).
3.4 Reversal Rate
While low interest rates reduce funding costs they can also pose problems for banks;
below a “reversal rate” the disadvantages may outweigh the advantages.26 Let R denote
25See Walsh (2017, 2.4.2) for a discussion of nonsuperneutrality.
26See, for example, Brunnermeier and Koby (2018). In a model with cash the effective lower bound
constitutes a critical threshold for the nominal interest rate. It is straightforward to analyze such an
effective lower bound in the model once one introduces inflation. Absent cash in the model, however,
such an analysis would be somewhat unfounded.
18
the gross reversal rate and suppose that policy makers aim at keeping banks’ preferred
deposit rate above the reversal rate:
Rft+1(1− χ̃nt+1(χrt+1, θt)) ≥ R.
For a given risk-free interest rate this can be achieved by raising the interest rate on
reserves or bank subsidies.
Under assumption 1 a marginal increase in the subsidy, which imposes fiscal costs
nt+1, relaxes the constraint by
Rft+1/(1− ψ).



























Accordingly, the cost-benefit ratios of higher bank subsidies and interest on reserves,







We thus have the following result:
Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, a reversal rate constraint can be relaxed more




that is, if external benefits of reserves are high or the risk-free rate low.
Intuitively, with external benefits of reserves holdings an increase in the interest rate
on reserves lowers the costs for banks both directly and, as a consequence of the optimal
portfolio adjustments of other financial institutions, indirectly. In contrast, a higher
subsidy only has a direct effect on bank costs. As a consequence, higher interest on
reserves raises the deposit rate more strongly than bank subsidies, per dollar of government
expenditure.
4 Optimality
In this section we discuss normative implications of the model. We allow for deposits,
reserves, and money to circulate in parallel.
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4.1 Social Planner Allocation





βtE0 [u(ct, zt+1, xt)]
s.t. κt+1 = ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ct −mt+1µt − nt+1νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− rt+1ρt,
κt+1,mt+1, nt+1, rt+1 ≥ 0.
The optimality conditions for capital, consumption, and leisure are standard. They yield
the usual first-order conditions, which also hold in the decentralized equilibrium (see
equations (2), (3), (12), (13), and (15)),
uc(ct, zt+1, xt) = βEt [(1− δ + fκ,t+1(κt+1, 1− xt+1))uc(ct+1, zt+2, xt+1)] ,
ux(ct, zt+1, xt) = uc(ct, zt+1, xt)f`,t(κt, 1− xt).
The optimality condition for reserves reads
ν1,t(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ν2,t(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ρt = 0 if nt+1 > 0,
rt+1 = 0 otherwise.
Intuitively, when the planner relies on deposits then it issues reserves up to the point
where the cost reduction for deposit payments, ν1,t(ζt+1, ζt+1)+ν2,t(ζt+1, ζt+1), is balanced
by the costs of managing the marginal reserve unit, ρt. If reserves exert an externality, i.e.,
if a bank’s reserves lower the operating costs of other banks such that ν2,t(ζt+1, ζt+1) 6= 0,
then the planner takes this into account. This contrasts with the decentralized equilib-
rium where a bank only internalizes its own cost reduction from reserve holdings, see
equation (10). Strict convexity of the function νt implies a unique mapping from ρt to
the optimal choice of reserves, conditional on nt+1.
27
Finally, the first-order conditions for money and deposits yield the optimality condition







where we use the condition for reserves derived above.28 The variable ζ?t+1 denotes the
reserves-to-deposits ratio chosen by the social planner when restricted to use deposits
rather than money.
To interpret equation (SP), consider first the case where reserves do not affect the
operating costs of deposit based payments such that νt is exogenous (the model variant
without the reserves layer). In this case, equation (SP) reduces to
uz(ct, zt+1, xt) = uc(ct, zt+1, xt) min[µt/λt, νt].
27By the mean value theorem, for any ε > 0 there exists an ι between 0 and ε such that ν1,t(ζ + ε, ζ +
ε)+ν2,t(ζ+ε, ζ+ε) = ν1,t(ζ, ζ)+ν2,t(ζ, ζ)+(ν11,t(ζ+ι, ζ+ι)+2ν12,t(ζ+ι, ζ+ι)+ν22,t(ζ+ι, ζ+ι))ε. Strict
convexity of νt implies that its Hessian is positive definite such that, in particular, ν11,t+2ν12,t+ν22,t > 0.
This implies that the function ν1,t(ζ, ζ)+ν2,t(ζ, ζ) is monotonically increasing in ζ and therefore invertible.
28The resource costs of a marginal deposit equal νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)−ζt+1 (ν1,t(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ν2,t(ζt+1, ζt+1)).
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This has two implications. One concerns the quantity of liquidity that is optimally pro-
vided, the other its source. As for the quantity, the social planner satiates the household
with real balances up to the point where the marginal benefit of real balances equals the
marginal resource costs, both expressed in utility terms. This is just a variant of the
Friedman (1969) rule which, in its more common form, abstracts from resource costs of
managing liquidity.
As for the source of liquidity, the optimality condition implies that the planner gener-
ically provides only one means of payment. When λt strictly exceeds (falls short of) µt/νt
then the first best involves money but no deposits (vice versa). Only when µt/νt = λt—
when the relative resource costs of money and deposits and their relative liquidity benefits
happen to coincide—is the planner indifferent between the two payment instruments.
Consider next the case where reserves do affect the operating costs of deposit based
payments such that νt is a function of ζt+1 (the baseline model). In this case, equation (SP)
holds and the optimal allocation still has the two properties emphasized before. The only
difference to the case with exogenous νt is that the planner compares the resource costs of
managing money (accounting for its liquidity benefits), µt/λt, and the costs of managing
deposits and reserves when the reserves-to-deposits ratio is chosen to minimize costs.
Summarizing:
Proposition 3. The social planner provides the means of payment with the lowest re-
source costs per unit of effective liquidity. It satiates the household with real balances
up to the point where the marginal benefit of real balances equals the marginal resource
costs.
The result that the social planner generically relies on a single means of payment
follows from our assumption that money and deposits enter additively in effective real
balances. In a more general setting with a nonlinear aggregation of the two sources of
liquidity it would typically be optimal to hold a portfolio including both money and
deposits.29 The satiation result, in contrast, would also hold in such a more general
setting.
4.2 Ramsey Policy
In contrast to the social planner, the Ramsey government controls the allocation and
liquidity only indirectly, by way of choosing policy instruments that support an equilib-
rium. We show next that the Ramsey government nevertheless can implement the social
planner allocation, even in the absence of central bank loans, {lt+1}t≥0 = 0. That is, we
show that there exists a policy P subject to {lt+1}t≥0 = 0 which supports an equilibrium
with the social planner allocation.30 Since any equilibrium satisfies the social planner’s
Euler equations for capital and leisure as well as the resource constraint the Ramsey pol-
icy implements the first best if the first-best quantities for money, deposits, and reserves
29A similar qualification applies with respect to the cost structure we have assumed. If both money
and deposits entered as arguments of µt and/or νt the planner might use both means of payment.
30Inequality (9) is not an equilibrium condition in this case.
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satisfy the equilibrium conditions for money and deposit holdings by households as well
as banks’ optimality conditions for deposits and reserves.
Suppose first that money is the more efficient means of payment, µt/λt ≤ νt(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1)+
ζ?t+1ρt, such that the social planner does not engage in deposit creation. The Ramsey gov-
ernment can replicate the first-best outcome in this case by issuing the efficient amount
of money, charging the liquidity premium on money
χm?t+1 ≡ µt, (RA-1)
and pricing banks out of the market. Equation (RA-1) follows directly from equations (4)
and (SP). To see that banks can be priced out of the market, recall from equation (5)
that households only hold deposits if the interest rate, Rnt+1, weakly exceeds R
f
t+1 −
(Rft+1 − Rmt+1)/λt. With χmt+1 = µt (or R
f
t+1 − Rmt+1 = µtR
f
t+1) this would require R
n
t+1 ≥
Rft+1(1 − µt/λt). But paying such a high interest rate would generate losses for banks
if the government set subsidies to zero and increased the liquidity premium on reserves
sufficiently, which it can.31
Suppose next that deposits are more efficient such that the social planner does not
issue money. In this case a tradeoff arises for the Ramsey government. On the one hand,
issuing money helps to check bank market power since the deposit spread reflects total
liquidity, not only the quantity of deposits. On the other hand, money provides liquidity
at a higher resource cost. As it turns out, the deposit subsidy, θt, helps to resolve this
tension.
To see this, consider first a relaxed program without the bank’s optimality condition for
deposits, inequality (8). In this relaxed program the Ramsey government can replicate the
first best by issuing no money but the efficient amount of deposits, charging the liquidity
premium on deposits
χn?t+1 ≡ νt(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1) + ζ?t+1ρt, (RA-2)
and setting the liquidity premium on reserves to
χr?t+1 ≡ −ν1,t(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1). (RA-3)
Equation (RA-2) follows again directly from equations (4) and (SP). The liquidity pre-
mium on reserves in (RA-3) follows from equation (10) and the planner’s optimal choice
of reserves: The premium must induce banks to select the first-best reserves-to-deposits
ratio even when there are external effects that the banks do not internalize. We conclude
that the Ramsey allocation in the relaxed program coincides with the social planner allo-
cation.32
Consider next the full Ramsey program including equation (8) or (8a). The key
question is how restrictive this equilibrium condition is: Can banks be induced to charge
31In the model variant without a reserves layer where νt is exogenous the same argument applies:
Without government subsidies, paying a “competitive” interest rate on deposits would generate losses for
banks.
32In the model variant without a reserves layer the right-hand side of equation (RA-2) is replaced by
νt. Moreover, the Ramsey government need not target the reserves-to-deposits ratio but it also has one
less instrument, χrt+1, at its disposal. As a consequence, the first best can still be implemented.
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the liquidity premium on deposits given in (RA-2)—and thus to demand the first-best
quantity of deposits—when the central bank charges the liquidity premium on reserves
given in (RA-3)? They can, when the subsidy θt in equation (8a) takes the value, θ
?
t , which
renders the equation evaluated at χn?t+1 and χ
r?
t+1 consistent with the first-best deposit
demand.33






− χn?t+1 + ν̃t(−χr?t+1),




t+1(1 − χn?t+1). Us-











The optimal subsidy has two components which reflect the two frictions, lack of compe-
tition and externalities. The effect of lack of competition on the subsidy is positive; the
higher the supply elasticity of deposits, the smaller this effect. The effect of the (positive)
externality, in contrast, is negative. Intuitively, with external benefits from reserves the
Ramsey government subsidizes reserves by issuing them at a reduced liquidity premium,
χr?t+1, and sterilizes the consequences of this intervention on the deposit margin by means
of a negative subsidy on deposits.
Summarizing:
Proposition 4. The Ramsey policy implements the first best independently of whether
the social planner relies on money or deposits. In the former case the Ramsey policy is
characterized by equation (RA-1). In the latter case it satisfies equations (RA-2)–(RA-4);
deposits may be taxed or subsidized.
Of course, proposition 4 also applies when exogenous restrictions rule out either money
or deposits such that a priori only a single retail means of payment is available. More
importantly, proposition 4 generalizes to settings with nonlinear aggregation of liquidity
(endogenous λt). The Ramsey policy can implement the social planner outcome even in
such general settings because the three policy instruments χmt+1, χ
r
t+1, and θt suffice to
control the amount of liquidity, its composition between deposits and money, and banks’
willingness to issue deposits.
4.3 Policy Rules
Under the Ramsey policy liquidity premia only respond to developments in the payment





33While the first best is a global maximum in the social planner’s program the first-best deposit quantity
need not correspond to a global optimum in the bank’s program subject to the subsidy. We neglect this
issue for now and restrict ourselves to a “first-order approach.” When we impose the functional form
assumptions the problem does not arise, see appendix B.
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ρt as well as the cost function νt. In contrast, the subsidy θ
?
t also reflects shocks to
preferences and firm technology, through their effects on the allocation (Rf?t+1).
34 Focusing
on the more interesting case with deposits and reserves we can derive further results by
imposing assumption 1. The optimal reserves-to-deposits ratio, liquidity premia, and
subsidy, respectively, then satisfy (see appendix B)
ζ?t+1 =
(



















(φ1,t + φ2,t)(ϕ− 1)
)1− 1
ϕ
(ψ(φ1,t + φ2,t)ϕ− φ2,t(ϕ− 1)) .
The optimal reserves-to-deposits ratio increases in the extent to which reserves lower the
costs of the deposit based payment system, both internally (φ1,t) or externally (φ2,t). The
optimal ratio falls with the central bank’s resource costs of reserves operations, ρt.
The optimal spread on reserves reflects the operating costs of the reserves layer, ρt.
When banks’ reserve holdings generate externalities (φ2,t > 0) then the Ramsey govern-
ment subsidizes reserve holdings, χr?t+1 < ρt, in order to induce banks to internalize the
external effects. The expression for χr?t+1 can be read as a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate
rule. It says that the optimal gross interest rate on reserves, Rr?t+1, should respond to the










That is, Rr?t+1 moves one-to-one with R
f
t+1 and at risk-free interest rates near zero (R
f
t+1 ≈
1) the optimal interest rate on reserves equals −ρtφ1,t/(φ1,t + φ2,t).
The optimal liquidity premium on deposits reflects the social costs of operating the
deposit payment system. When reserves are costless to provide (ρt = 0) then the optimal
liquidity premium equals zero. When reserves operations require resources (ρt > 0), in
contrast, then the structure of the function νt matters for the liquidity premium. When
reserves are more important for the payment system, either internally or externally, then
the liquidity premium rises; this effect is weaker when ϕ is large such that the elasticity
of νt with respect to the reserves-to-deposits ratio is strongly negative.
Finally, the sign of the optimal subsidy is ambiguous as already stated in proposition 4.
Lack of competition (ψ) affects the subsidy positively, externalities (φ2,t) negatively. More
specifically, we have the following result:
34This holds true unless Rn?t+1/R
f?




Proposition 5. Under assumption 1, the optimal subsidy in an economy with deposits







and strictly positive when the reverse inequality holds.
When reserves do not generate externalities (φ2,t = 0) then the subsidy is positive and
in fact, θ?t = ψχ
n?
t+1; in the limit where consumption and effective real balances are perfect
substitutes (ψ → 0) the subsidy equals zero in this case.
Optimal policy in the model variant without a reserves layer follows when we let
ϕ→ 1: The optimal reserves-to-deposits ratio satisfies ζ?t+1 = 0 in this case; the optimal
liquidity premium on deposits satisfies χn?t+1 = φ1,t+φ2,t; and the optimal subsidy satisfies




In this section we establish an equivalence class of monetary arrangements with different
compositions of real balances. Subsequently, we exploit the equivalence result to assess
implicit subsidies to the banking system. In appendix D we establish a second equivalence
result that relates changes in taxes and the ownership structure of capital.
5.1 Equivalence of Monetary Arrangements
The main equivalence result, which extends results in Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019)
and Niepelt (2018; 2020), establishes the “irrelevance” of the composition of real bal-
ances:35 It implies that, as long as the private and public sector are equally efficient in
operating payment systems, a change in the composition of real balances in the household
sector need not affect the equilibrium allocation. For the central bank can always assure
that a portfolio shift from deposits into money leaves equilibrium consumption, capital
accumulation, and the price system unchanged.
Private and public means of payment thus are substitutes in general equilibrium as long
as the central bank intervenes appropriately. If it does, portfolio shifts out of deposits
and into money (CBDC) do not endanger bank funding nor do they undermine bank
intermediation. Importantly, and as will become clear, these results do not require any
assumptions regarding a specific monetary friction; that is, they hold independently of
whether the money-in-the-utility-function specification used so far or any other monetary
friction is assumed.
The following condition stipulates that the resource costs per effective unit of real
balances are identical for the central bank and banks:
35Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) consider the case without reserves nor resource costs of providing
liquidity. Substitutability between money and deposits guarantees “liquidity neutrality” in the terminol-
ogy of Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019).
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Condition 1. µt/λt = νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ζt+1ρt where ζt+1 denotes the equilibrium reserves-
to-deposits ratio.
Consider a reduction in deposit holdings at date t, complemented by a (not necessarily
equal sized) increase in money holdings also at date t. We have the following result, which
is formally stated and proved in appendix C:
Proposition 6. Suppose condition 1 holds. Consider a policy and equilibrium with
deposits, reserves, and no central bank loan. There exists another policy and equilibrium
with fewer deposits and reserves, more money, a central bank loan, a different ownership
structure of capital, and otherwise the same allocation and price system.36 The central
bank loan carries the interest rate
Rlt+1 =





The logic underlying the proposition is simple: When households supply fewer deposits
to banks but hold more money with the central bank then the central bank can pass this
additional funding through to the banking sector as loans. Bank intermediation need
not change. With an appropriate choice of loan supply schedule the central bank can
replicate the effective choice set of banks before the intervention. Subject to this loan
supply schedule the initial equilibrium prices and allocation and the modified portfolios
constitute an equilibrium. The effects on the real economy are confined to portfolio
changes. Establishing these results requires an analysis of the budget and choice sets of
banks, households, firms, and the government, see appendix C. As emphasized before this
analysis is orthogonal to a specific monetary friction, for instance money in the utility
function.
According to proposition 6 the loan interest rate, Rlt+1, which supports the equivalent
portfolio positions, reflects the (old and new) equilibrium reserves-to-deposits ratio, ζt+1.
There are three reasons for this dependence; they relate both to the quantity of bank
funding and its price. First, one dollar of deposit funding only results in 1− ζt+1 dollars
of net bank funding because the bank invests ζt+1 dollars in reserves. This explains the
1 − ζt+1 term in the denominator of the expression for the loan rate. Second, the cost
of deposit sourced funding depends on the share of deposits that is invested in reserves.
This explains the term −ζt+1Rrt+1 in the numerator. And third, the reserves-to-deposits
ratio affects the operating costs, νt(ζt+1, ζt+1).
Two further remarks are in order. First, in the model variant without a reserves layer
where νt is exogenous the proposition applies subject to the obvious modifications. In
particular, the condition for equivalence is given by µt/λt = νt in that case. Second, since
the first-best reserves-to-deposits ratio, ζ?t+1, may differ from the ratio in equilibrium the
condition for the equivalence of money and deposits, condition 1, need not coincide with
the condition under which the social planner is indifferent between the two means of







37 That is, it is conceivable that the introduction
36The new policy may also include state contingent taxes whose market value equals zero.
37However, in the model variant without a reserves layer the two conditions coincide.
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of money (CBDC) is “irrelevant” as far as equilibrium outcomes are concerned although
the social planner or the Ramsey government strictly prefers money over deposits or vice
versa.
5.2 Bank Profits and Lender-of-Last-Resort Support
Banks earn profits by providing liquidity. But do banks themselves create this liquidity?
Or do they benefit from beliefs held by the public (and upheld by instruments such
as deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities) that these claims are implicitly
guaranteed by the central bank? If one accepts the latter view then it is natural to ask
how valuable the implicit guarantees for banks are, that is, how highly banks are implicitly
subsidized. If one accepts the view that banks themselves create the value associated with
liquidity then it is equally natural to ask how high that value is. Proposition 6 allows to
answer these questions.
To price the liquidity created by deposits it suffices to price the marginal unit. Assum-
ing that condition 1—identical resource costs of deposit and money liquidity services—
holds at the margin we conclude from proposition 6 that an equilibrium allocation where
households transact using deposits (be it an optimal allocation or not) can alternatively
be supported by an arrangement in which the central bank extends a loan in the amount of
nt+1(1− ζt+1) as a substitute for the deposit funding nt+1 net of reserve holdings nt+1ζt+1.











If the central bank or markets funded banks at the “illiquid” market interest rate,
bank funding would cost Rft+1 per unit. In an arrangement with deposits, or equivalently
with a central bank loan priced at the equivalent loan rate, however, bank funding costs
Rlt+1 per unit. The total funding cost reduction that banks enjoy, expressed as a share of







In the following we provide estimates for fcrt.
Figure 2 displays quarterly U.S. time series data for the (inflation adjusted) gross
reserve rate, Rrt+1, the gross risk-free rate, R
f
t+1, and the gross deposit rate, R
n
t+1; the
data spans the interval 1999q1–2017q4. We use FRED data for the interest rate on
reserves and Kurlat’s (2019) estimates of the risk-free, “illiquid” interest rate as well as
the deposit rate. Appendix E contains detailed information.
The figure shows that the (inflation adjusted) interest rate on reserves fluctuates in a
band between −3 and 0 percent while the risk-free rate varies between −2 and 4 percent.
After 2010, the two rates nearly coincide. The deposit rate typically lies between the
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Figure 2: Gross interest rates.
below the other two rates. Between 2009 and 2015, the spreads between the three rates
nearly disappear.
Figure 3 displays quarterly time series data for the reserves-to-deposits ratio, ζt+1, over
the same period. We use FRED data as well as data constructed by Lucas and Nicolini
(2015) for reserves and deposits. For the deposit series, we use two alternative measures.
The first, indicated by [a], is the sum of checkable and savings deposits. The second,
indicated by [b], is the sum of checkable deposits and money market deposit accounts as
specified by Lucas and Nicolini (2015). Appendix E contains more information.
Independently of the exact measure, the reserves-to-deposits ratio strongly increases
in mid 2008, from a very low level (at which it had been since the early 1980s). It reaches
a maximum of 30 or 45 percent, depending on the measure, in mid 2014 and falls back to
20 or 30 percent by the end of 2017.
Figure 4 displays estimates of the implied loan rate, Rlt+1, and funding cost reduction
for banks, fcrt, under the assumption that νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− θt = 0.01.38 (Below, we present
alternative results based on a model implied measure of νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) − θt.) The two
estimates of Rlt+1 and fcrt correspond to the two measures of the reserves-to-deposits
ratio; the differences are minor.
The equivalent central bank loan interest rate displayed in the top panel falls from
nearly 2 percent early in the sample to −0.5 percent towards the end, with a temporary
increase to 1 percent in late 2010. Intuitively, prior to 2009 when ζt+1 is very small the
equivalent loan rate roughly equals Rnt+1 + 0.01 as R
f
t+1 ≈ 1. In 2009, 1 − ζt+1 increases
38Lucas and Nicolini (2015, p. 57) assume that banks’ costs of check processing equals 1 percent of
GDP. Philippon (2015) estimates that the costs of financial intermediation equal 1.5 to 2 percent of
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Figure 3: Two measures of the reserves-to-deposits ratio.
and this pushes Rlt+1 up: One dollar of net funding now requires more than one dollar
of deposit funding and this increases the equivalent loan rate as long as Rrt+1 < R
n
t+1.
Between 2009 and 2015, Rrt+1 ≈ Rnt+1 and the equivalent loan rate therefore roughly
follows Rrt+1 + 0.01/(1− ζt+1). After 2015 the deposit rate falls short of the reserve rate
and this contributes negatively to the equivalent loan rate.
The bottom panel of figure 4 illustrates the implied funding cost reduction for banks.
The times series fluctuates between 0.8 and −0.7 percent of GDP, reflecting two major
drivers. On the one hand, the long-term downward trend in Rft+1 −Rlt+1 and its fluctua-
tions. And on the other hand, the U-shaped path of 1− ζt+1 after 2008 and an increasing
deposits-to-GDP ratio. Early in the sample the equivalent central bank loan reduces
banks’ funding costs by roughly 0.5 percent of GDP because the risk-free rate exceeds the
equivalent loan rate. Subsequently, when the interest rate differential Rft+1−Rlt+1 changes
from positive to negative, fcrt becomes slightly negative before approaching 0.8 percent
in 2006. In early 2009 the interest rate differential turns negative again, pushing fcrt for
another eight years into negative territory. Only in 2017 does the interest rate differential





becomes positive as well.
Figure 5 displays estimates of the implied loan rate and funding cost reduction under
the alternative assumption that banks optimally set the deposit rate. Under assumption 1
the first-order condition of banks implies νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) − θt = (1 − ψ)χnt+1 − ζt+1χrt+1
(see appendix A). We assume that ψ = 0.5 and based on this assumption, back out
νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) − θt. The implied equivalent loan rate again displays a downward trend,
falling by roughly 3 percent over the sample period and interrupted by a hump before the
financial crisis (that is, earlier than under the previous calibration). The implied funding
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cost reduction varies between 0 and 0.5 percent of GDP. It is always positive because
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Figure 4: Two measures of the equivalent central bank gross loan interest rate (top) and
banks’ funding cost reduction (bottom) under the assumption that νt − θt = 0.01.
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Figure 5: Two measures of the equivalent central bank gross loan interest rate (top)
and banks’ funding cost reduction (bottom) under the assumption that the optimality
condition of banks holds and ψ = 0.5.
In conclusion, we find that under either calibration assumption the U.S. banking sector
benefited from a funding cost reduction of roughly 0.4 to 0.8 percent of GDP just before
and around the financial crisis but did not benefit from such a cost reduction, or even
bore additional funding costs, once financial markets calmed. These numbers compare
with NIPA data for financial sector profits on the order of 3 percent of GDP prior to
the financial crisis, negative profits during the crisis, and 2 to 3 percent of GDP after
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the financial crisis. During the financial crisis the low equivalent loan rate relative to
the risk-free interest rate appears to have been an important factor to contribute towards
stabilizing U.S. banks’ profits.
6 Politics




























When the central bank issues money and banks do not issue deposits, nt+1 = 0, the
optimal monetary policy implements the Friedman rule for money according to which
the liquidity premium on money equals the operating costs of running a money based
payment system, see equation (RA-1). As a consequence, the central bank balances its
budget, at least in present value.
When the central bank does not issue money, mt+1 = 0, but banks issue deposits, in
contrast, then two structural effects undermine budget balance under the optimal policy:
First, the central bank makes losses on its reserves management operations if reserves
exert a positive externality. This follows from equation (RA-3), which implies
χr?t+1 − ρt = χr?t+1 + ν1,t(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1) + ν2,t(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1) = ν2,t(ζ?t+1, ζ?t+1) < 0.
Second, the central bank or the treasury pay a (positive or negative) subsidy to induce
banks to charge the first-best liquidity premium on deposits, see equation (RA-4). Sum-











that is, the budgetary impact under the optimal policy is unambiguously negative unless
banks are competitive.40
To understand this result, recall that the subsidy has two components. The first ad-
dresses the distortion due to lack of competition, and the second sterilizes the effect of the
central bank’s artificially low spread on reserves when reserves generate positive external-
ities. Since the second component of the subsidy exactly balances the fiscal effects of the
artificially cheap reserves the net budgetary impact fully reflects the subsidy component
that addresses lack of competition.
We summarize the discussion in the following proposition:








Proposition 7. Under the optimal policy, the government must fiscally support a deposit
based payment system unless banks are competitive. This is not the case with a money
based payment system.
We conclude the section with some speculative conclusions from proposition 7. One
conclusion relates to the political support for the introduction of CBDC. When conditon 1
holds such that deposits can be replaced by CBDC without changing the allocation one
might expect political support for the introduction of CBDC since the fiscal costs of a two-
tiered payment system exceed those in a money based system. In the model considered
in this paper this result would immediately follow when taxes were assumed to cause
distortions. In a richer framework with heterogeneous groups of households the political
support for CBDC would also depend on the distribution of tax burdens, the ownership
structure of banks, and the aggregation of preferences in the political process.
Another conclusion relates to central bank independence which is widely seen as a key
pillar of stability oriented monetary policies. One factor contributing to this independence
is a structural central bank surplus. A central bank with structural deficits that regularly
requires fiscal support from the treasury (because the treasury does not directly fund
bank subsidies itself) is in a weaker position to defend its independence than a central
bank that generates surpluses.41 From this perspective the model suggests that a money
(CBDC) based payment system would better safeguard central bank independence.42
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed monetary policy in a two-tiered monetary system with noncompetitive
banks that issue deposits and a central bank that issues reserves and a retail CBDC.
Monies differ with respect to operating costs and liquidity. We have mapped the frame-
work into a baseline business cycle model with “pseudo wedges” and derived optimal
Taylor (1993)-type policy rules: Spreads satisfy modified Friedman rules and deposits
must be taxed or subsidized.
We have also generalized the Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) result on the macro
irrelevance of CBDC and we have shown that a bank based payment system requires
higher taxes. This could strengthen the political support for the introduction of CBDC
and it could imply that central bank independence is under greater threat in a deposit
rather than CBDC based payment system. We have used the equivalence result to assess
the funding cost reduction for U.S. banks due to the fact that they can issue deposits.
The model implied annual funding cost reduction amounts to up to 0.8 percent of GDP
during the period 1999–2017.
Our framework offers a tractable workhorse model to study monetary policies that
are concerned with the payment system and financial stability. It naturally lends itself
41See Del Negro and Sims (2015) and Hall and Reis (2015) for possible implications of large central
bank balance sheets on the need for treasury support for central banks.
42There are other political economy considerations that the analysis abstracts from. For example,
a money (CBDC) based arrangement necessitates a larger central bank balance sheet which arguably
invites more lobbying and political interference. See Niepelt (2020) for a discussion.
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to many extensions. One such extension could be to integrate price rigidities and conse-
quently, policy motives related to demand stabilization. Another natural extension could
be to integrate heterogeneity and political economy considerations, as discussed above.
We leave these extensions for future research.
A General Equilibrium under Assumption 1
Households Let At ≡ (1−ϑ)c1−ψt +ϑz
1−ψ
t+1 such that the marginal utilities of consump-
tion and real balances, respectively, are given by












Firms Wages and the return on capital, respectively, satisfy
wt = f`,t(κt, 1− xt), Rkt = 1− δ + fκ,t(κt, 1− xt).
A.1 Case With Deposits
Consider first the case with deposits, nt+1 > 0.
Households The Euler equation for real balances, equation (4), then reduces to
ϑz−ψt+1
(1− ϑ)c−ψt























































Banks If the central bank targets χmt+1 and both money and deposits circulate then χ
n
t+1
is pinned down by equation (5).
In the following we consider the more interesting case where the central bank targets
quantities (possibly mt+1 = 0) such that the spread on deposits reflects bank market
power. To derive the bank’s optimal demand for deposits conditional on the optimal
choice of reserves, an instance of equation (8a), suppose first that the central bank directly
























where ξt+1 ≡ nt+1/zt+1 denotes the share of deposits in effective real balances. Accord-
























In a monetary arrangement without money (mt+1 = 0 and ξt+1 = 1) the two cases collapse
to one.
The bank’s optimality condition for reserves, equation (10), implies
























































































The household’s optimality conditions for capital and leisure, equations (2) and (3), con-






























subject to the firm optimality conditions.
The third equilibrium condition is given by the resource constraint (with mt+1 = 0)
subject to optimal real balances holdings as well as bank and firm choices. This can be
written as
κt+1 = ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ct − nt+1νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− rt+1ρt
= ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ct − nt+1 (νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ζt+1ρt)
= ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ctΩrct (χrt+1, θt),
Ωrct (χ
r










(νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) + ζt+1ρt)














A.2 Case Without Deposits
Consider next the case without deposits, mt+1 > 0 and nt+1 = 0.

































































Combined Equilibrium Conditions Define
Ψxt (χ
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The household’s optimality conditions for capital and leisure, equations (2) and (3), con-





























subject to the firm optimality conditions.
The third equilibrium condition is given by the resource constraint (with nt+1 = 0)
subject to optimal money holdings as well as firm choices. This can be written as
κt+1 = ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ct −mt+1µt
= ft(κt, 1− xt) + κt(1− δ)− ctΨrct (χmt+1),
Ψrct (χ
m










B Optimality under Assumption 1










t+1) = −ρt ⇒ ζ?t+1 =
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The shadow liquidity premium on reserves thus equals








t+1) equals its equilibrium counterpart, ν1,t(ζt+1, ζt+1), when χ
r
t+1 =





t+1) = (φ1,t + φ2,t)
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Ramsey Policy The optimal liquidity premia under the Ramsey policy follow directly
from the shadow premia in the social planner allocation. As for the optimal subsidy, note






Solving this equation for θ?t (or substituting the expression for equilibrium ηn,t+1 into the




(φ1,t + φ2,t)(ϕ− 1)
)1− 1
ϕ
(ψ(φ1,t + φ2,t)ϕ− φ2,t(ϕ− 1)) .
C Proof of Proposition 6
We state proposition 6, prove it, and discuss its implications for portfolios and budgets.
We consider an intervention which reduces deposit holdings at date t by ∆ > 0 and
increases money holdings at date t by λ−1t ∆. To guarantee nonnegativity of deposits,
capital holdings, and reserves the intervention ∆ must not be too large.43
Proposition Suppose condition 1 holds. Consider a policy and equilibrium with de-
posits, reserves, and no central bank loan. There exists another policy and equilibrium,
indicated by circumflexes, with fewer deposits and reserves, more money, a central bank
loan, a different ownership structure of capital, possibly household taxes at dates t and
t+1 whose market value equals zero, and otherwise the same allocation and price system.
The two policies and equilibria coincide except that
m̂t+1 = mt+1 + λ
−1
t ∆, n̂t+1 = nt+1 −∆, l̂t+1 = ∆(1− ζt+1), r̂t+1 = rt+1 − ζt+1∆,




t+1 − (1− λ−1t )∆.
The household tax at date t, T̂1,t, and the state contingent tax at date t + 1, T̂2,t+1 (in
addition to τt+1), satisfy
T̂1,t = ∆{νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− θt},
T̂2,t+1 = ∆{(1− λ−1t )Rkt+1 + λ−1t Rmt+1 −Rnt+1 − (νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)− θt)R
f
t+1}.
The central bank loan carries the interest rate
Rlt+1 =









t )∆ ≥ −kt+1, and ζt+1∆ ≤ rt+1. The
assumption that the central bank loan in the initial equilibrium equals zero is a convenient normalization.
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Implications for Portfolios and Budgets Note that in an equilibrium with deposits
reserves are strictly positive such that 0 < ζt+1 < 1.
The portfolio and policy changes described in the proposition have several implications.
First, ẑt+1 = zt+1, m̂t+1µt+n̂t+1νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)+ r̂t+1ρt = mt+1µt+nt+1νt(ζt+1, ζt+1)+rt+1ρt,
and κ̂t+1 = κt+1; that is, the portfolio changes do not alter effective real balances, the
aggregate capital stock, or the total resource costs of operating the payment system.
Note that the portfolio changes also leave the reserves-to-deposits ratio, ζt+1, and thus
νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) unchanged.
Second, the length of the household’s balance sheet does not change since the house-
hold swaps assets (deposits, money, and capital). In contrast, the balance sheet of a bank
shortens (unless ζt+1 = 0) because the bank holds less reserves and reduces total borrow-
ing (in the form of deposits and central bank loans) but invests the same amount in capital
as before the intervention. The balance sheet of the consolidated government expands by
(λ−1t − ζt+1)∆ Q 0: The central bank raises additional funds ∆/λt from households but
fewer funds from banks, −ζt+1∆; it passes ∆(1− ζt+1) through to the banking sector and
increases capital holdings by (λ−1t − 1)∆.
Third, the new tax at date t compensates for the reduced bank losses borne by house-
holds, π̂b1,t−πb1,t = T̂1,t. Similarly, the new state contingent taxes at date t+1 compensate
for the change in the return on the household portfolio as well as the change in bank
profits that households collect at date t + 1.44 The market value of the two taxes as of
date t equals zero, T̂1,t +Et[sdft+1T̂2,t+1] = 0, and so does the market value of the changes
in bank profits.45 As a consequence, the household’s dynamic and intertemporal budget
constraints continue to be satisfied with the modified portfolios and policy.
Fourth, the same holds true for the government. From equation (14), the government




t −mtRmt − rtRrt + τt −
n̂t+1θt−m̂t+1µt− r̂t+1ρt+T̂1,t. Condition 1 implies that this equality is satisfied if and only
if the budget constraint was satisfied before the intervention. Similarly, the government






t+1 − m̂t+1Rmt+1 −
r̂t+1R
r
t+1 + τt+1 − nt+2θt+1 −mt+2µt+1 − rt+2ρt+1 + T̂2,t+1, is equivalent to the constraint
before the change of portfolios and policy.
Proof Conjecture that the price system does not change, as claimed in the proposition.
The optimal production decisions of firms are unchanged in this case, as are firm profits.
Moreover, the market values of labor income, taxes, and bank profits (as shown above)
also do not change. As a consequence, household wealth is unaffected, and so are the
optimal consumption and real balances sequences. As shown above, these sequences are
supported by the modified portfolios. It remains to be shown that the modified bank







t+1−∆Rnt+1 and the latter π̂b2,t+1−πb2,t+1 = −∆(Rkt+1−Rnt+1)+∆(1−ζt+1)(Rkt+1−
Rlt+1)− ζt+1∆(Rrt+1 −Rkt+1) = −∆(νt(. . .)− θt)R
f
t+1, where we use the expression for the loan rate.





t+1 − (νt(. . .) − θt) = 0, where we use equation (5). The market value of the change in bank
profits equals π̂b1,t − πb1,t + Et[sdft+1(π̂b2,t+1 − πb2,t+1)] = T̂1,t −∆(νt(. . .)− θt) = 0.
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portfolios are optimal; in that case, all budget constraints are satisfied at the optimal
choices, equilibrium capital accumulation is unchanged, and the conjecture is verified.
To render deposits n̂t+1, loans l̂t+1, and reserves r̂t+1 optimal for a bank it suffices
for the central bank to supply loans such that the bank’s choice sets before and after
the intervention coincide. Before the intervention, this choice set is determined by the
operating cost function, νt; the subsidy, θt; deposit supply as a function of the deposit
rate; the stochastic discount factor; and the return on capital. After the intervention, it
is defined by the same cost function, subsidy rate, stochastic discount factor, and return
on capital; a modified deposit supply function (because households hold more money);
and a central bank loan supply function.
To assure identical choice sets it therefore suffices for the central bank to post an
appropriate loan supply schedule. This schedule makes up for the shift in the deposit
supply schedule, corrected for the fact that 1− ζt+1 dollars of central bank loans provide
the same net funding as one dollar of deposits of which ζt+1 dollars are invested in re-
serves.46 Subject to the appropriate loan supply schedule a bank chooses a quantity of
loans that makes up for the reduction in funding (net of reserves) from households, at the
same effective price; moreover, it chooses the same reserves-to-deposits ratio such that
νt(ζt+1, ζt+1) is unaffected.
D Irrelevance of Timing of Household Taxes
The second equivalence result, which is in the spirit of Barro (1974) and Wallace (1981),
establishes a form of Ricardian equivalence. Since taxes are nondistorting and the house-
hold and the government have the same time horizon a wealth-neutral change in the
profile of household taxes does not alter the allocation if households can undo this change
by way of portfolio adjustments. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 8. Consider a policy that supports an equilibrium. Consider a modified
policy, indicated by circumflexes, which differs with respect to the timing of taxes but not
their total value,
{τ̂t}t≥0 6= {τt}t≥0 but
∞∑
t=0
E0[sdft(τ̂t − τt)] = 0.
Suppose the government and the household can trade assets such that along each history,
the cash flow profile of the asset trades equals {τ̂t − τt}t≥0 (and the new asset positions
do not violate nonnegativity constraints on capital holdings). Then, the modified policy
supports an equilibrium. This equilibrium coincides with the initial equilibrium except
for the asset positions.
The proof of proposition 8 follows directly from the standard proof of Ricardian equiv-
alence:47 Conjecture that the policy change does not alter prices, and thus household
46If the banking sector were competitive no pass through funding would be required; equivalence could
also be achieved if banks shed assets, see Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019).
47See for example Niepelt (2019)
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wealth. Since taxes are nondistorting the choice set of households is unchanged and house-
holds optimally respond to the modified tax profile by adjusting their asset holdings. To
satisfy the government budget constraint the government adjusts its asset holdings in
the opposite direction. Since the bank’s problem is not affected by the policy change
aggregate net asset holdings remain unchanged, verifying the conjecture and proving the
result.
One implication of proposition 8 concerns steady states. Consider an economy that is
in steady state from date t = 0 onward; policy supports an equilibrium with household
taxes and capital holdings (τ, k, kg, kb) where bank capital holdings equal kb = n+ l − r.
Proposition 8 implies that the same policy except for a modified tax profile, namely
τ̂0 = τ −∆, τ̂t = τ + (Rk − 1)∆, t ≥ 1, ∆ > 0,
supports the same equilibrium except for modified capital holdings, namely




t+1 −∆, k̂bt+1 = kbt+1, t ≥ 0.
That is, there exists another steady state with the same consumption, real balances,
prices, and total capital stock, but with household taxes and capital holdings given by
(τ + (Rk − 1)∆, k + ∆, kg −∆, kb).
E Data
We use the quarterly average of the FRED series IOER (2008q4–2019q4) for the nom-
inal interest rate on reserves. Since no interest on reserves was paid prior to 2008
(see https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm) we set
Rrt+1 = 1/Πt+1 prior to 2008 where Πt+1 denotes gross inflation. We use the quarterly av-
erage of the FRED series CPILFESL PC1 (Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers:
All Items Less Food and Energy in U.S. City Average, Percent Change from Year Ago,
Index 1982–1984=100, Seasonally Adjusted) for gross inflation.
We use quarterly averages of Kurlat’s (2019) monthly estimates (1999m01–2017m12)
of the risk-free rate and the deposit rate.48 Kurlat (2019) provides two estimates of
the latter (based on RateWatch data), one based on data for checking accounts and the
other for money market accounts. We compute a weighted average of the two estimates
where the weights correspond to the relative size of checkable and savings deposits. We
use quarterly averages of the FRED series TCDSL (Total Checkable Deposits, Billions
of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted) and SAVINGSL (Savings Deposits - Total, Billions of
Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted) for checkable and savings deposits, respectively. We adjust
the constructed interest rate series using the inflation series defined before.
We use the quarterly average of the FRED series RESBALNS (Total Reserve Balances
Maintained with Federal Reserve Banks, Billions of Dollars, Not Seasonally Adjusted)
for reserves. We use two alternative series for deposits. The first series ([a]) is the sum
of the quarterly averages of the FRED series TCDSL and SAVINGSL defined before. The
48We thank Pablo Kurlat for sharing his data.
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second series ([b]) is the sum of the quarterly average of the FRED series TCDSL and
the quarterly money market deposit account (MMDA) series constructed by Lucas and
Nicolini (2015).49 We compute ζt+1 as the ratio of the reserve series and either of the
two deposit series. We compute deposits as a share of GDP as the ratio of either of the
two deposit series and the FRED series GDP (Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Dollars,
Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate).
We use the quarterly FRED series A587RC1Q027SBEA (Corporate profits with inven-
tory valuation and capital consumption adjustments: Domestic industries: Financial) for
banking profits.
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